We develop a theory for stochastic control problems which, in various ways, are time inconsistent in the sense that they do not admit a Bellman optimality principle. We attach these problems by viewing them within a game theoretic framework, and we look for Nash subgame perfect equilibrium points. For a general controlled Markov process and a fairly general objective functional we derive an extension of the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, in the form of a system of non-linear equations, for the determination for the equilibrium strategy as well as the equilibrium value function. All known examples of time inconsistency in the literature are easily seen to be special cases of the present theory. We also prove that for every time inconsistent problem, there exists an associated time consistent problem such that the optimal control and the optimal value function for the consistent problem coincides with the equilibrium control and value function respectively for the time inconsistent problem. We also study some concrete examples.
Introduction
In a standard continuous time stochastic optimal control problem the object is that of maximizing (or minimizing) a functional of the form
where X is some controlled Markov process, u s is the control applied at time s, and F , C are given functions. A typical example is when X is a controlled scalar SDE of the form dX t = µ(X t , u t )dt + σ(X t , u t )dW t , with some initial condition X 0 = x 0 . Later on in the paper we will allow for more general dynamics than those of an SDE, but in this informal section we restrict ourselves for simplicity to the SDE case.
Dynamic programming and time consistency
A standard way of attacking a problem like the one above is by using Dynamic Programming (henceforth DynP). We restrict ourselves to control laws, i.e., the control at time s, given that X s = y, is of the form u(s, y) where the control law u is a deterministic function. We then embed the problem above in a family of problems indexed by the initial point. More precisely we consider, for every (t, x), the problem P t,x of maximizing E t,x T t C (s, X s , u s ) ds + F (X T ) .
given the initial condition X t = x. Denoting the optimal control law for P t,x by u tx (s, X s ) and the corresponding optimal value function by V (t, x) we see that the original problem corresponds to the problem P 0,x0 .
We note that ex ante the optimal control law u tx (s, X s ) for the problem P t,x must be indexed by the initial point (t, x). However, problems of the kind described above turn out to be time consistent in the sense that we have the Bellman optimality principle, which roughly says that the optimal control is independent of the initial point. More precisely: if a control law is optimal on the full time interval [0, T ], then it is also optimal for any subinterval [t, T ]. Given the Bellman principle, it is easy to informally derive the Hamilton-JacobiBellman (henceforth HJB) equation
for the determination of V . One can (with considerable effort) show rigorously that, given enough regularity, the optimal value function will indeed satisfy the HJB equation. On can also (quite easily) prove a verification theorem which says that if V is a solution of the HJB equation, then V is indeed the optimal value function for the control problem, and the optimal control law is given by the maximizing u in the HJB equation. We end this section by listing some important points concerning time consistency.
Remark 1.1
The main reasons for the time consistency of the problem above are as follows.
• The integral term C (s, X s , u s ) in the problem P t,x is allowed to depend on s, X s and u s . It is not allowed to depend on the initial point (t, x).
• The terminal evaluation term is allowed to be of the form E t,x [F (X T )], i.e the expected value of a non-linear function of the terminal value X T . Time consistency is then a relatively simple consequence of the law of iterated expectations. We are not allowed to have a term of the form G(E t,x [X T ]), which is a non-linear function of the expected value.
• We are not allowed to let the terminal evaluation function F depend on the initial point (t, x).
Three disturbing examples
We will now consider three seemingly simple examples from financial economics, where time consistency fail to hold. In all these cases we consider a standard Black-Scholes model for an underlying stock price S, as well as a bank account B with short rate r.
dS t = αS t dt + σS t dW t , dB t = rB t dt.
We consider a self financing portfolio based on S and B where u t is the number of dollars invested in the risky asset S, and c is the consumption rate at time t.
Denoting the market value process of this portfolio by X, we have dX t = [rX t + (α − r)u t − c t ]dt + σu t dW t , and we now consider three indexed families of optimization problems. In all cases the (naive) objective is to maximize the objective functional J(t, x, u), where (t, x) is the initial point and u is the control law.
Hyperbolic discounting

J(t, x, u) = E t,x T t ϕ(s − t)h(c s )dt + ϕ(T − t)F (X T )
In this problem h is the local utility of consumption, F is the utility of terminal wealth, and ϕ is the discounting function. This problem differs from a standard problem by the fact that the initial point in time t enters in the integral (see Remark 1.1). Obviously; if ϕ is exponential so ϕ(s − t) = e −a(s−t then we can factor out e at and convert the problem into a standard problem with objective functional J(t, x, u) = E t,x T t e −as h(c s )dt + e −aT F (X T )
One can show, however, that every choice of the discounting function ϕ, apart from the the exponential, case, will lead to a time inconsistent problem. More precisely, the Bellman optimality principle will not hold.
Mean variance utility
This case is a continuous time version of a standard Markowitz investment problem where we want to maximize utility of final wealth. The utility of final wealth is basically linear in wealth, as given by the term E t,x [X T ], but we penalize the risk by the conditional variance γ 2 V ar t,x (X T ). This looks innocent enough, but we recall the elementary formula
Now, in a standard time consistent problem we are allowed to have terms like E t,x [F (X T )] in the objective functional, i.e. we are allowed to have the expected value of a non-linear function of terminal wealth. In the present case, however we have the term (E t,x [X]) 2 . This is not a nonlinear function of terminal wealth, but instead a non-linear function of the expected value of terminal wealth, and we thus have a time inconsistent problem (see Remark 1.1).
Endogenous habit formation
In this case we basically want to maximize log utility of terminal wealth. In a standard problem we would have the objective E t,x [ln (X T − d)] where d > 0 is the lowest acceptable level of terminal wealth. In our problem, however, the lowest acceptable level of terminal wealth is given by x − β and it thus depends on your wealth X t = x at time t. This again leads to a time inconsistent problem.
Approaches to handle time inconsistency
In all the three examples of the previous subsection we are faced with a time inconsistent family of problems, in the sense that if for some fixed initial point (t, x) we determine the control lawû which maximizes J(t, x, u), then at some later point (s, X s ) the control lawû will no longer be optimal for the functional J(s, X s , u). It is thus conceptually unclear what we mean by "optimality" and even more unclear what we mean by "an optimal control law", so our first task is to specify more precisely exactly which problem we are trying to solve. There are then at least three different ways of handling a family of time inconsistent problems, like the ones above
• We dismiss the entire problem as being silly.
• We fix one initial point, like for example (0, x 0 ), and then try to find the control lawû which maximizes J(0, x 0 , u). We then simply disregard the fact that at a later points in time such as (s, X s ) the control lawû will not be optimal for the functional J(s, X s , u). In the economics literature, this is known as pre-commitment.
• We take the time inconsistency seriously and formulate the problem in game theoretic terms.
All of the three strategies above may in different situations be perfectly reasonable, but in the present paper we choose the last one. The basic idea is then that when we decide on a control action at time t we should explicitly take into account that at future times we will have a different objective functional or, in more loose terms, "our tastes are changing over time". We can then view the entire problem as a non-cooperative game, with one player for each time t, where player t can be viewed as the future incarnation of ourselves (or rather of our preferences) at time t. Given this point of view, it is natural to look for Nash equilibria for the game, and this is exactly our approach.
In continuous time it is far from trivial to formulate this intuitive idea in precise terms. We will do this in the main text below but a rough picture of the game is as follows.
• We consider a game with one player at each point t in time. This player is referred to as "player t". You may think of player t as a future incarnation of yourself, but conceptually it may be easier to think of the game as being played by a continuum of completely different individuals.
• Depending on t and on the position x in space, player t will choose a control action. This action is denoted by u(t, x), so the strategy chosen by player t is given by the mapping x −→ u(t, x).
• A control law u can thus be viewed as a complete description of the chosen strategies of all players in the game.
• The reward to player t is given by the functional J(t, x, u). We note that in the three examples of the previous section it is clear that J(t, x, u) does not depend on the actions taken by any player s for s < t, so in fact J does only depend on the restriction of the control law u to the time interval
It is also clear that this is really a game, since the reward to player t does not only depend on the strategy chosen by himself, but also by the strategies chosen by all players coming after him in time.
We can now loosely define the concept of a "Nash subgame perfect equilibrium point" of the game. This is a control lawû satisfying the following condition:
• Choose an arbitrary point t in time.
• Suppose that every player s, for all s > t, will use the strategyû(s, ·).
• Then the optimal choice for player t is that he/she also uses the strategŷ u(t, ·).
The problem with this "definition" in continuous time is that the individual player t does not really influence the outcome of the game at all. He/she only chooses the control at the single point t, and since this is a time set of Lebesgue measure zero, the control dynamics will not be influenced. For a proper definition we need some sort of limiting argument, which is given in the main text below.
Previous literature
The game theoretic approach to time inconsistency using Nash equilibrium points as above has a long history starting with [10] where a deterministic Ramsay problem is studied. Further work along this line in continuous and discrete time is provided in [5] , [6] , [7] , and [8] .
Recently there has been renewed interest in these problems. In the interesting, and mathematically very advanced, papers [3] and [4] , the authors consider optimal consumption and investment under hyperbolic discounting (Problem 1 in our list above) in deterministic and stochastic models from the above game theoretic point of view. To our knowledge, these papers were the first to provide a precise definition of the equilibrium concept in continuous time. The authors derive, among other things, an extension of the HJB equation to a system of PDEs including an integral term, and they also provide a rigorous verification theorem. They also, in a tour de force, derive an explicit solution for the case when the discounting function is a weighted sum of two exponential discount functions. Our present paper is much inspired by these papers, in particular for the definition of the equilibrium law.
In [1] the authors undertake a deep study of the mean variance problem within a Wiener driven framework. This is basically Problem 2 in the list above, but the authors also consider the case of multiple assets, as well as the case of a hidden Markov process driving the parameters of the asset price dynamics. The authors derive an extension of the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman equation and manages, by a number of very clever ideas, to solve this equation explicitly for the basic problem, and also for the above mentioned extensions. The paper has two limitations: Firstly, from a mathematical perspective it is somewhat heuristic, the equilibrium concept is never given a precise definition, and no verification theorem is provided. Secondly, and more importantly, the methodology depends heavily on the use of a "total variance formula", which in some sense (partially) replaces the iterated expectations formula in a standard problem. This implies that the basic methodology cannot be extended beyond the mean variance case. The paper is extremely thought provoking, and we have benefited greatly from reading it.
Contributions of the present paper
The object of the present paper is to undertake a rigorous study of time inconsistent control problems in a reasonably general Markovian framework, and in particular we do not want to tie ourselves down to a particular applied problem. We have therefore chosen a setup of the following form.
• We consider a general controlled Markov process X, living on some suitable space (details are given below). It is important to notice that we do not make any structural assumptions whatsoever about X, and we note that the setup obviously includes the case when X is determined by a system of SDEs driven by a Wiener and a point process.
• We consider a functional of the form
We see that with the choice of functional above, time inconsistency enters at several different points. Firstly we have the appearance of the present state x in the local utility function C, as well as in the functions F and G, and this leads of course to time inconsistency. Secondly, in the term
we have, even forgetting about the appearance of x, a non linear function G acting on the conditional expectation, again leading to time inconsistency.
Note that, for notational simplicity we have not explicitly included dependence on running time t. This can always be done by letting running time be one component of the state process X, so the setup above also allows for expressions like F (t, x, X u T ) etc, thus allowing (among many other things) for hyperbolic discounting.
This setup is studied in some detail in continuous as well as in discrete time. The discrete time results are parallel to those in continuous time, and our main results in continuous time are as follows.
• We provide a precise definition of the Nash equilibrium concept. (This is done along the lines of [3] and [4] ).
• We derive an extension of the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to a non standard system of equations for the determination of the equilibrium value function V .
• We prove a verification theorem, showing that the solution of the extended HJB system is indeed the equilibrium value function, and that the equilibrium strategy is given by the optimizer in the equation system.
• We prove that to every time inconsistent problem of the form above, there exists an associated standard, time consistent, control problem with the following properties:
-The optimal value function for the standard problem coincides with the equilibrium value function for the time inconsistent problem.
-The optimal control law for the standard problem coincides with the equilibrium strategy for the time inconsistent problem.
• We solve some specific test examples.
Our framework and results extends the existing theory considerably. As we noted above, hyperbolic discounting is included as a special case of the theory. The mean variance example from above is of course also included. More precisely it is easy to see that it corresponds to the case when
We thus extend the existing literature by allowing for a considerably more general utility functional, and a completely general Markovian structure. The existence of the associated equivalent standard control problem is to our knowledge a completely new result.
Structure of the paper
Since the equilibrium concept in continuous time is a very delicate one, we start by studying a discrete time version of our problem in Section 2. In discrete time there are no conceptual problems with the equilibrium concept, but the arguments are sometimes quite delicate, the expressions are rather complicated, and great care has to be taken. It is in fact in this section that the main work is done. In Section 3 we study the continuous time problem by taking formal limits for a discretized problem, and using the results of the Section 2. This leads to an extension of the standard HJB equation to a system of equations with an embedded static optimization problem. The limiting procedure described above is done in an informal manner and it is largely heuristic, so in order to prove that the derived extension of the HJB equation is indeed the correct one we also provide a rigorous proof of a verification theorem. In Section 4 we prove the existence of the associated standard control problem, and in Sections 5-6 we study some examples. We finish by giving some related results on precommitment for time inconsistent problems in Section ??.
Discrete time
Since the theory is conceptually much easier in discrete time than in continuous time, we start by presenting the discrete time version.
Setup
We consider a given controlled Markov process X, evolving on a measurable state space {X , G X }, with controls taking values in a measurable control space {U, G U }. The action is in discrete time, indexed by the set N of natural numbers. The intuitive idea is that if X n = x, then we can choose a control u n ∈ U, and this control will affect the transition probabilities from X n to X n+1 . This idea is formalized by specifying a family of transition probabilities, {p u n (dz; x) : n ∈ N, x ∈ X , u ∈ U} . For every fixed n ∈ N, x ∈ X and u ∈ U, we assume that p u n (·; x) is a probability measure on X , and for each A ∈ G X , the probability p u n (A; x) is jointly measurable in (x, u). The interpretation of this is that p u n (dz; x) is the probability distribution of X n+1 , given that X n = x, and that we at time n apply the control u, i.e.,
To obtain a Markov structure, we restrict the controls to be feedback control laws, i.e. i.e. at time n, the control u n is allowed to depend on time n and state X n . We can thus write
where the mapping u : N × X → U is measurable. Note the boldface notation for the mapping u. In order to distinguish between functions and function values, we will always denote a control law (i.e. a mapping) by using boldface, like u, whereas a possible value of the mapping will be denoted without boldface, like, u ∈ U.
Given the family of transition probabilities we may define a corresponding family of operators, operating on function sequences. Definition 2.1 A function sequence is a mapping f : N × X → R, where we use the notation (n, x) −→ f n (x).
• For each u ∈ U, the operator P u , acting on the set of integrable function sequences, is defined by
The corresponding discrete time "infinitesimal" operator A u is defined by
where I is the identity operator.
• For each control law u the operator P u is defined by
and A u is defined correspondingly as
In more probabilistic terms we have the interpretation.
and A u is the discrete time version of the continuous time infinitesimal operator. We immediately have the following result.
Proposition 2.1 Consider a real valued function sequence {f n (x)}, and a control law u. The process f n (X u n ) is then a martingale under the measure induced by u if and only if the sequence {f n } satisfies the equation
Proof. Obvious from the definition of A u .
It is clear that for a fixed initial point (n, x) and a fixed control law u we may in the obvious way define a Markov process denoted by X n,x,u , where for notational simplicity we often drop the upper index n, x and use the notation X u . The corresponding expectation operator is denoted by E 
Basic problem formulation
For a fixed (n, x) ∈ N × X , a fixed control law u, and a fixed time horizon T , we consider the functional
Obviously, the functional J depends only on the restriction of the control law u to the time set k = n, n + 1, . . . , T − 1.
The intuitive idea is that we are standing at (n, x) and that we would like to choose a control law u which maximizes J. We can thus define an indexed family of problems {P n,x } by
where max is shorthand for the imperative "maximize!". The complicating factor here is that the family {P n,x } is time inconsistent in the sense that ifû is optimal for P n,x , then the restriction ofû to the time set k, k + 1, . . . , T (for k > n) is not necessarily optimal for the problem P k,X u k . There are two reasons for this time inconsistency:
• The shape of the utility functional depends explicitly on the initial position x in space, as can be seen in the appearance of x in the expression F (x, X T ) and similarly for the other terms. In other words, as the X process moves around, our utility function changes, so at time t this part of the utility function will have the form F (X t , X T ).
• For a standard time consistent control problem we are allowed to have expressions like E n,x [G(X T )] in the utility function, i.e. we are allowed to have the expected value of a non linear function G of the future process value. Time consistency is then a relatively simple consequence of the law of iterated expectations. In our problem above, however, we have an expression of the form
, which is not the expectation of a non linear function, but a nonlinear function of the expected value. We thus do not have access to iterated expectations, so the problem becomes time inconsistent. On top of this we also have the appearance of the present state x in the expression
The moral of all this is that we have a family of time inconsistent problems or, alternatively, we have time inconsistent preferences. If we at some point (n, x) decide on a feedback lawû which is optimal from the point of view of (n, x) then as time goes by, we will no longer considerû to be optimal. To handle this problem we will, as outlined above, take a game theoretic approach and we now go on the describe this in some detail.
The game theoretic formulation
The idea, which appears already in [10] , is to view the setup above in game theoretic terms. More precisely we view it as a non-cooperative game where we have one player at each point n in time. We refer to this player as "player number n" and the rule is that player number n can only choose the control u n . One interpretation is that these players are different future incarnations of yourself (or rather incarnations of your future preferences), but conceptually it is perhaps easier to think of it as one separate player at each n.
Given the data (n, x), player number n would, in principle, like to maximize J n (x, u) over the class of feedback controls u, but since he can only choose the control u n , this is not possible. Instead of looking for "optimal" feedback laws, we take the game theoretic point of view and study so called subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategies. The formal definition is as follows.
Definition 2.2
We consider a fixed control lawû and make the following construction.
1. Fix an arbitrary point (n, x) where n < T , and choose an arbitrary control value u ∈ U.
2. Now define the control lawū on the time set n, n + 1, . . . , T − 1 by setting, for any y ∈ X ,
We say thatû is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy if, for every fixed (n, x), the following condition hold
If an equilibrium controlû exists, we define the equilibrium value function V by V n (x) = J n (x,û).
In more pedestrian terms this means that if player number n knows that all players coming after him will use the controlû, then it is optimal for player number n also to useû n . Remark 2.1 An equivalent, and perhaps more concrete, way of describing an equilibrium strategy is as follows.
• The equilibrium controlû T −1 (x) is obtained by letting player T −1 optimize J T −1 (x, u) over u T −1 for all x ∈ X . This is a standard optimization problem without any game theoretic components.
• The equilibrium controlû T −2 is obtained by letting player T − 2 choose u T −2 to optimize J T −2 , given the knowledge that player number T − 1 will useû T −1 .
• Proceed recursively by induction.
Obviously; for a standard time consistent control problem, the game theoretic aspect becomes trivial and the equilibrium control law coincides with the standard (time consistent) optimal law. The equilibrium value function V will coincide with the optimal value function and, using dynamic programming arguments, V is seen to satisfy a standard Bellman equation.
The main result of the present paper is that in the time inconsistent case, the equilibrium value function V will satisfy a system of non linear equations. This system of equations extend the standard Bellman equation, and for a time consistent problem they reduce to the Bellman equation.
The extended Bellman equation
In this section we assume that there exists an equilibrium control lawû (which may not be unique) and we consider the corresponding equilibrium value function V defined above. The goal of this section is to derive an system of equations, extending the standard Bellman equation, for the determination of V . This will be done in the following two steps:
• For an arbitrarily chosen control law u, we will derive a recursive equation for J n (x, u).
• We will then fix (n, x) and consider two control laws. The first one is the equilibrium lawû, and the other one is the law u where we choose u = u n (x) arbitrarily, but follow the lawû for all k with k = n+1, . . . T −1.
The trivial observation that
will finally give us the extension of the Bellman equation.
The reader with experience from dynamic programming (DynP) will recognize that the general program above is in fact more or less the same as for standard (time consistent) DynP. However; in the present time inconsistent setting, the derivation of the recursion in the first step is much more tricky than in the corresponding step from DynP, and it also requires some completely new constructions.
The recursion for J n (x, u)
In order to derive the recursion for J n (x, u) we consider an arbitrary initial point (n, x), and we consider an arbitrarily chosen control law u. The value taken by u at (n, x) will play a special role in the sequel, and for ease of reading we will use the notation u n (x) = u. We now go on to derive a recursion between J n and J n+1 . This is conceptually rather delicate, and sometimes a bit messy. In order to increase readability we therefore carry out the derivation only for the case when the objective functional does not contain the sum (1), and thus has has the simpler form
We provide the result for the general case in Section 2.4.3. The derivation of this is completely parallel to that of the simplified case. We start by making the observation that X n+1 will only depend on x and on the control value u n (x) = u motivating the notation X u n+1 . The distribution of X k for k < n + 1 will, on the other hand depend on the control law u (restricted to the interval [n, k]) so for k > n + 1 we use the notation X u k .
We now go on to the recursion arguments. From the definition of J we have
where for simplicity of notation we write
[·]. We now make the following definitions which will play a central role in the sequel. Definition 2.3 For any control law u, we define the function sequences {f
We also introduce the notation
The difference between f u,y n and f u n , is that we view f u n as a function of the two variables x and y, whereas f u,y n is, for a fixed y, viewed as a function of the single variable x.
From the definitions above it is obvious that, for any fixed y, the processes f u,y n (X u n ) and g u n (X u n ) are martingales under the measure generated by u. We thus have the following result.
Lemma 2.1 For every fixed control law u and every fixed choice of y ∈ X , the function sequence {f u,y n } satisfies the recursion
The sequence {g u n } satisfies the recursion
Going back to (3) we note that, from the Markovian structure and the definitions above, we have
We can now write (3) as
Taking expectations gives us
and, going back to the definition of J n (x, u), we can write this as
At this point it may seem natural to use the identities
and that
) . Substituting these identities into the recursion above, we can now collect the findings so far.
Lemma 2.2
The value function J satisfies the following recursion.
) .
The recursion for V n (x)
We will now derive the fundamental equation for the determination of the equilibrium function V n (x). In order to do this we assume that there exists an equilibrium controlû. We then fix an arbitrarily chosen initial point (n, x) and consider two strategies (control laws).
1. The first control law is simply the equilibrium lawû.
2. The second control law u is slightly more complicated. We choose an arbitrary point u ∈ U and then defined the control law u as follows
for all choices of u ∈ U. We thus have the inequality
for all u ∈ U, with equality if u =û n (x). We thus have the basic relation
We now make a small variation of Definition 3. and {g k } T k=0 , where f k , g k : X × X → R by.
Using Lemma 2.2, the basic relation (4) now reads
We now observe that, since the control law u coincides with the equilibrium laŵ u on [n + 1, T − 1], we have the following equalities
We can thus write the recursion as
The first line in this equation can be rewritten as
The second line can be written as
To avoid misunderstandings: The first term (A u f ) n (x, x), can be viewed as the operator A u operating on the function sequence {h} n defined by h n (x) = f n (x, x). In the second term, A u is operating on the function sequence f x n (·) where the upper index x is viewed as a fixed parameter.
We rewrite the third line of the recursion as
In order to simplify this we need to introduce some new notation.
Definition 2.5
The function sequence {G g} k and, for a fixed z ∈ X , the mapping G z : X → R are defined by
With this notation we can write
We now introduce the last piece of new notation.
Definition 2.6 With notation as above we define the function sequence
Finally, we may state the main result for discrete time models.
Theorem 2.1 Consider a functional of the form (2), and assume that an equilibrium control lawû exists. Then the the equilibrium value function V satisfies the following equation.
where the supremum above is realized by u =û n (x). Furthermore, for every fixed y ∈ X the function sequence f y n (x) is determined by the recursion Aûf y n (x) = 0, n = 0, . . . , T − 1,
and f (x, y) is given by
The function sequence g n (x) is determined by the recursion.
In these recursions, theû occurring in the expression Aû is the equilibrium control law.
We now have some comments on this result.
• The first point to notice is that we have a system of recursion equation (5)- (12) for the simultaneous determination of V , f and g.
• In the case when F (x, y) does not depend upon x, and there is no G term, the problem trivializes to a standard time consistent problem. The terms (5) cancel, and the system reduces to the standard Bellman equation
• In order to solve the V -equation (5) we need to know f and g but these are determined by the equilibrium control lawû, which in turn is determined by the sup-part of (5).
• We can view the system as a fixed point problem, where the equilibrium control lawû solves an equation of the form M (û) =û. The mapping M is defined by the following procedure.
-Start with a control u.
-Generate the functions f and g by the recursions
and the obvious terminal conditions.
-Now plug these choices of f and g into the V equation and solve it for V . The control law which realizes the sup-part in (5) is denoted by M (u). The optimal control law is determined by the fixed point problem M (û) =û.
This fixed point property is rather expected since we are looking for a Nash equilibrium point, and it is well known that such a point is typically determined as fixed points of a mapping. We also note that we can view the system as a fixed point problem for f and g.
• In the present discrete time setting, the situation is, however, simpler than the fixed point argument above may lead us to believe. In fact; looking closer at the recursions, it turns out that the system for V , f , and g is a formalization of the recursive strategy outlined in Remark 2.1.
The general case
We now consider the more general functional form given in (1).
The arguments for the C terms in the sum above are very similar to the arguments for the F term. It is thus natural to introduce an indexed function sequence defined by
where, as usual,û denotes the equilibrium law. The result is as follows. We omit the proof, which is a small variation of the previous one.
Theorem 2.2
Consider a functional of the form (11), and assume that an equilibrium control lawû exists. Then the the equilibrium value function V satisfies the following equation.
where the supremum above is realized by u =û n (x). Furthermore, for every fixed y ∈ X the function sequence f y n (x) is determined by the recursion Aûf y n (x) = 0, n = 0, . . . , T − 1, f y T (x) = F (y, x), and f (x, y) is given by
Aûg n (x) = 0, n = 0, . . . , T − 1,
For every k = 1, . . . , T , the function sequence c
Continuous time
We now turn to the more delicate case of continuous time models. We start by presenting the basic setup in term of a fairly general controlled Markov process. We then formulate the problem and formally define the continuous time equilibrium concept. In order to derive the relevant extension of the HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation we discretize, use our previously derived results in discrete time, and go to the limit. Since the limiting procedure is somewhat informal we need to prove a formal verification theorem, showing the connection between the extended HJB equation and the previously defined equilibrium concept.
Setup
We consider, on the time interval [0, T ] a controlled Markov process in continuous time. The process X lives on a measurable state space {X , G X }, with controls taking values in a measurable control space {U, G U }. The way that controls are influencing the dynamics of the process is formalized by specifying the controlled infinitesimal generator of X.
Definition 3.1 For any fixed u ∈ U we denote the corresponding infinitesimal generator by A u . For a control law u, the corresponding generator is denoted by A u .
As an example: of X is a controlled SDE of the form
then we have, for any real valued function f (t, x), and for any fixed u ∈ U
For a control law u(t, x) we have
By the Kolmogorov backward equation, the infinitesimal generator will, for any control law u, determine the distribution of the process X, and to stress this fact we will use the notation X u t . In particular we will have, for each h ∈ R an operator P u h , operating on real valued functions of the form f (t, x), and defined as
We also recall that
Basic problem formulation
For a fixed (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × X , a fixed control law u, we consider the functional
(14) As in discrete time we have the game theoretic interpretation that, for each point t in time we have a player ("player t") choosing u t who wants to maximize the functional above. Player t can, however, only affect the dynamics of the process X by choosing the control u t exactly at time t. At another time, say s, the control u s will be chosen by player s. We again attack this problem by looking for a Nash subgame perfect equilibrium point. The intuitive picture is exactly like in continuous time: An equilibrium strategyû is characterized by the property that if all players on the half open interval (t, T ] useû, then it is optimal for player t to useû.
However, in continuous time this is not a bona fide definition. Since player t can only choose the control u t exactly at time t, he only influences the control on a time set of Lebesgue measure zero, and for most models this will have no effect whatsoever on the dynamics of the process. We thus need another definition of the equilibrium concept, and we follow [3] and [4] , who were the first to use the definition below. Definition 3.2 Consider a control lawû (informally viewed as a candidate equilibrium law). Choose a fixed u ∈ U, a fixed real number h > 0. Also fix an arbitrarily chosen initial point (t, x). Define the control law u h by
for all u ∈ U, we say thatû is an equilibrium control law. The equilibrium value function V is defined by V (t, x) = J(t, x,û).
Remark 3.1 This is our continuous time formalization of the corresponding discrete time equilibrium concept. Note the necessity of dividing by h, since for most models we trivially would have
We also note that we do not get a perfect correspondence with the discrete time equilibrium concept, since if the limit above equals zero for all u ∈ U, it is not clear that this corresponds to a maximum or just to a stationary point.
The extended HJB equation
We now assume that there exists an equilibrium control lawû (not necessarily unique) and we go on to derive and extension of the standard Hamilton-JacobiBellman (henceforth HJB) equation for the determination of the corresponding value function V . As in the discrete case we restrict ourselves to the simpler case when the integral term in (14) is absent. The general case is very similar and will be treated in Section 3.3.2.To clarify the logical structure of the derivation we outline our strategy as follows.
• We discretize (to some extent) the continuous time problem. We then use our results from discrete time theory to obtain a discretized recursion for u and we then let the time step tend to zero.
• In the limit we obtain our continuous time extension of the HJB equation.
Not surprisingly it will in fact be an equation system.
• In the discretizing and limiting procedure we mainly rely on informal heuristic reasoning. In particular we do not claim that the derivation is a rigorous one. The derivation is, from a logical point of view, only of motivational value.
• We show that our extended HJB equation is in fact the "correct" one, by proving a rigorous verification theorem.
Deriving the equation
In this section we will, in an informal and heuristic way, derive a continuous time extension of the HJB equation. Note again that we have no claims to rigor in the derivation, which is only motivational. To this end we assume that there exists an equilibrium lawû and we argue as follows.
• Choose an arbitrary initial point (t, x). Also choose a "small" time increment h > 0.
• Define the control law u h on the time interval [t, T ] by u h (s, y) = u, for t ≤ s < t + h, y ∈ X u(s, y),
for t + h ≤ s ≤ T, y ∈ X
• If now h is "small enough" we expect to have
and in the limit as h → 0 we should have equality if u =û(t, x).
If we now use our discrete time results, with n and n + 1 replaced by t and t + h, we obtain the inequality
and similarly for the other terms. We now divide the inequality by h and let h tend to zero. The the operator A u h will converge to the infinitesimal operator A u , but the limit of h
Furthermore we have the approximation
and using a standard Taylor approximation for G x we obtain
where
We thus obtain
Collecting all results we arrive at our proposed extension of the HJB equation.
To stress the fact that the arguments above are largely informal we state the equation as a definition rather than as proposition.
Definition 3.3
The extended HJB system of equations for the Nash equilibrium problem is defined as follows.
Hereû is the control law which realizes the supremum in the first equation, and f y , G g, and Hg are defined by
We now have some comments on the extended HJB system.
• In the case when F (x, y) does not depend upon x, and there is no G term, the problem trivializes to a standard time consistent problem. The terms (A u f ) (t, x, x) + (A u f x ) (t, x) in the V -equation cancel, and the system reduces to the standard Bellman equation
• In order to solve the V -equation we need to know f and g but these are determined by the optimal control lawû, which in turn is determined by the sup-part of the V -equation.
• We can view the system as a fixed point problem, where the optimal control law u solves an equation of the form M (u) = u. The mapping M is defined by the following procedure.
-Generate the functions f and g by the ODEs
-Now plug these choices of f and g into the V equation and solve it for V . The control law which realizes the sup-part in the V -equation is denoted by M (u). The optimal control law is determined by the fixed point problem M (û) =û.
• The equations for g and f y state that the processes g(t, Xû t ) and f y (t, Xû t )) are martingales. From the boundary conditions we then have the interpretation
A version of g function above appears, in a more restricted framework, already in [1] .
The general case
We now turn to the more general functional form given in(14) as
(15) Arguing as before we are led to the following definition.
Definition 3.4
The extended HJB system of equations for the Nash equilibrium problem with the functional (15) is defined as follows.
Hereû is the control law which realizes the supremum in the first equation, and f y , c s,y , G g, and Hg are defined by
A simple special case
We see that the general extended HJB equation is quite complicated. In many concrete cases there are, however, cancellations between different terms in the equation. The simplest case occurs when the objective functional has the form
, and X is a scalar diffusion of the form
In this case the extended HJB equation has the form
and a simple calculation shows that
Thus the extended HJB equation becomes
We will use this result in Section 5 below.
A Verification Theorem
As we have noted above, the derivation of the continuous time extension of the HJB equation is rather informal. It seems reasonable to expect that the system in Definition 3.4 will indeed determine the equilibrium value function V , but so far nothing has been formally proved. However, the following two conjectures are natural.
• Assume that there exists an equilibrium lawû and that V is the corresponding value function. Assume furthermore that V is regular enough to allow allow A u to operate on it (in the diffusion case this would imply V ∈ C 1,2 ). Define f and g by
Then V satisfies the extended HJB system andû realizes the supremum in the equation.
• Assume that V , f , and g solves the extended HJB system and that the supremum in the V -equation is attained for every (t, x). Then there exists an equilibrium lawû, and it is given by the optimal u in the V -equation. Furthermore, V is the corresponding equilibrium value function, and f and g allow for the interpretations (17)-(18).
In this paper we do not attempt to prove the first conjecture. Even for a standard time consistent control problem, it is well known that this is technically quite complicated, and it typically requires the theory of viscosity solutions. We will, however, prove the second conjecture. This obviously has the form of a verification result, and from standard theory we would expect that it can be proved with a minimum of technical complexity.
Theorem 3.1 (Verification Theorem) Assume that V , f , g is a solution of the extended system in Definition 3.4, and that the control lawû realizes the supremum in the equation. Thenû is an equilibrium law, and V is the corresponding value function. Furthermore, f and g can be interpreted according to (17)- (18).
Proof. The proof consists of two steps:
• We start by showing that V is the value function corresponding toû, i.e. that V (t, x) = J(t, x,û), and that f and g have the interpretations (17)-(18).
• In the second step we then prove thatû is indeed an equilibrium control law.
To show that V (t, x) = J(t, x,û), we use the V equation to obtain:
Since V , f , and g satisfies the extended HJB, we also have
and we thus have the equation
We now use Dynkin's Theorem which says that if X is a process with infinitesimal operator A, and if h(t, x) is a sufficiently integrable real valued function, then the process
Ah(s, X s )ds is a martingale. Using Dynkin's Theorem we thus have
and from (21) we obtain
We again refer to Dynkin and obtain
Using this and the boundary conditions for f and g we get
Now, from (19)-(20) it follows that the processes f y (s, Xû s ) and g(s, Xû s ) are martingales, so from the boundary conditions for f and g we obtain
This shows that f and g have the correct interpretation and, plugging it into (22) we obtain
We now go on to show thatû is indeed an equilibrium law. To that end we construct, for any h > 0 and an arbitrary u ∈ U, the control law u h defined in Definition 3.2. From Lemma 2.2, applied to the points t and t + h, we have
where, for ease of notation, we have suppressed the lower index h of u h . By the construction of u we have
so we obtain
Furthermore, from the V -equation we have
for all u ∈ U. Discretizing this gives us
or, after simplification,
Using the expression for J n (x, u) above, and the fact that V (t, x) = J(t, x,û), we obtain
and we are done.
An equivalent time consistent problem
The object of the present section is to provide a surprising link between time inconsistent and time consistent problems. To this end we go back to the general continuous time extended HJB equation. The first part of this reads as
Let us now assume that there exists an equilibrium control lawû. Usingû we can then construct c, f and g by solving the associated equations in Definition 3.4. We now define the function h by
With this definition of h, the equation for V above and its boundary condition become
We now observe, by inspection, that this is a standard HJB equation for the standard time consistent optimal control problem to maximize
We have thus proved the following result.
Proposition 4.1 For every time inconsistent problem in the present framework there exists a standard, time consistent optimal control problem with the following properties.
• The optimal value function for the standard problem coincides with the equilibrium value function for the time inconsistent problem.
• The optimal control for the standard problem coincides with the equilibrium control for the time inconsistent problem.
• The objective functional for the standard problem is given by (23).
We immediately remark that the Proposition above is mostly of theoretical interest, and of little "practical" value. The reason is of course that in order to formulate the equivalent standard problem we need to know the equilibrium controlû. In our opinion it is, however, quite surprising.
Furthermore, Proposition 4.1 has modeling consequences for economics. Suppose that you want to model consumer behavior. You have done this using standard time consistent dynamic utility maximization and now you are contemplating to introduce time inconsistent preferences to obtain a richer class of consumer behavior. Proposition 4.1 then tells us that from the point of view of revealed preferences, nothing is gained by introducing time inconsistent preferences: Every kind of behavior that can be generated by time inconsistency can also be generated by time consistent preferences. We immediately remark, however, that even if a concrete model of time inconsistent preferences is, in some sense, "natural", the corresponding time consistent preferences may look extremely "weird".
Example 1: Mean-variance control
In this section we will illustrate the theory developed earlier, and as a first test example we will consider dynamic mean variance optimization. This is a continuous time version of a standard Markowitz investment problem, where we penalize the risk undertaken by the conditional variance. As noted in the introduction, in a Wiener driven framework this example is studied intensively in [1] , where the authors also consider the case of multiple assets, as well as the case of a hidden Markov process (unobservable factors) driving the parameters of the asset price dynamics. For illustrative purposes we first consider the simplest possible case of a Wiener driven single risky asset and, without any claim of originality, re-derive the corresponding results of [1] . We then extend the model in [1] and study the case when the risky asset is driven by a point process as well as by a Wiener process.
The simplest case
We consider a market formed by a risky asset with price process S and a risk free money account with price process B. The price dynamics are given by dS t = αS t dt + σS t dW t , dB t = rB t dt, where α and σ are known constants, and r is the constant short rate.
Let u t be the amount of money invested in the risky asset at time t. The value X t of a self-financing portfolio based on S and B will then evolve according to the SDE
Our value functional is given by
so we want to maximize expected return with a penalty term for risk. Remembering the definition for the conditional variance
we can re-write our objective functional as
As seen in the previous sections, the term G(E t,x [X T ]) leads to a time inconsistent game theoretic problem. The extended HJB equation is then given by the following PDE system:
where lower case index denotes the corresponding partial derivative. This case is covered in Section 3.3.3, and from (16) we can simplify to
Given the linear structure of the dynamics, as well as of the boundary conditions, it is natural to make the Ansatz
With this trial solution the HJB equation becomes
A(T ) = 1,
We first solve the static problem embedded in (25). From the first order condition, we obtain the optimal control aŝ
so the optimal control does not depend on x. Substituting this expression forû into (25) we obtain:
By separation of variables we then get the following system of ODEs.
A t + Ar = 0,
We immediately obtain A(t) = e r(T −t) .
Inserting this expression for A into the second ODE yields
This equation contain the unknown function a, and to determine this we use equation (26). Inserting the expression forû into (26) gives us
Again we have separation of variables and obtain the system a t + ar = 0,
This yields a(t) = e r(T −t) , and the ODE for b then takes the form
We thus have
Introducing the results in the optimal control formula, we get u(t, x) = 1 γ α − r σ 2 e −r(T −t) .
Using the expression for a above, we can go back to equation (27) which now takes the form
Thus, the optimal value function is given by
We summarize the results as follows:
Proposition 5.1 For the model above we have the following results.
• The optimal amount of money invested in a stock is given bŷ
• The equilibrium value function is given by
• The expected value of the optimal portfolio is given by
Using Proposition 4.1 we can also construct the equivalent standard time consistent optimization problem. An easy calculation gives us the following result.
Proposition 5.2 The equivalent (in the sense of Proposition 4.1) time consistent problem is to maximize the functional
given the dynamics (24).
We note in passing that σ 2 u
A point process extension
We will now present an extension of the mean variance problem when the stock dynamics are driven by a jump diffusion. We consider a single risky asset with price S and a bank account with price process B. The results below can be easily extended to the case of multiple assets, but for ease of exposition, we restrict ourselves to the scalar case. The dynamics are given by
Here W is a scalar Wiener process and µ is a marked point process on the mark space Z with deterministic intensity measure λ(dz). Furthermore, α(t, s), σ(t, s) and β(z) are known deterministic functions and r is a known constant. As before u t denotes the amount of money invested in the stock at time t, and X is the value process for a self financing portfolio based on S and B. The dynamics of X t are then given by dX t = [rX t + (α(t, S t , Y t ) − r)u]dt + σ(t, S t , Y t )udW t + u t− Z β(z)µ(dz, dt).
Again we study the case of mean-variance utility, i.e.
J(t, x, u)
The extended HJB system now has the form sup u {A u V (t, x, s) − A u (G • g)(t, x, s) + (H u g) (t, x, s)} = 0,
V (T, x, s) = x, Aûg = 0,
g(T, x, s) = x.
As before, we make the Ansatz Again we see that the optimal control does not depend on x. We can plug the optimal control into equation (30) and as before, we can separate variables to obtain an ODE for A(t) and a PIDE for B(t, s). The ODE for A is In order to solve this we need to determine the functions a(t) and b(t, s). To this end we use (29). This can be rewritten as We can now insert this expression, as well as the formula for a, into the PIDE for b above to obtain the PIDE 
Here the measure Q is absolutely continuous w.r.t. P , and the likelihood process
has dynamics given by
with ϕ and η given by ϕ(t, s) = − α(t, s) − r + Z β(y)λ(dy) σ(t, s) [σ 2 (t, s) + Z β 2 (y)λ(dy)] , η(t, s, z) = − α(t, s) − r + Z β(y)λ(dy) [σ 2 (t, s) + Z β 2 (y)λ(dy)] β(z).
From the Girsanov Theorem it follows that the Q intensity λ Q , of the point process µ(dt, dz) is given by λ Q (t, s, dz) = 1 − α(t, s) − r + Z β(y)λ(dy) [σ 2 (t, s) + Z β 2 (y)λ(dy)] β(z) λ(dz),
Further examples
Under construction.
7 Conclusions and future research.
We have derived an extension of the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation to a non standard system of equations for the determination of the equilibrium value function V which would allow us to solve a larger of non-standard economic and financial problems. Among the problems one can analyze classical problems such as mean variance portfolio allocation and the Merton problem with hyperbolic discounting. We have also proven a veriffication theorem, showing that the solution of the extended HJB system is indeed the equilibrium value function, and that the equilibrium strategy is given by the optimizer in the equation system. To every time inconsistent problem of the form analyzed, there exists an associated standard, time consistent, control problem. While this observation is mostly of theoretical interest, and of little "practical" value, it has interesting consequences for economic modelling. From the point of view of revealed preferences, nothing is gained by introducing time inconsistent preferences: Every kind of behavior that can be generated by time inconsistency can also be generated by time consistent preferences. We immediately remark, however, that even if a concrete model of time inconsistent preferences is, in some sense, "natural", the corresponding time consistent preferences may look extremely "weird". In the case of mean variance allocation problems, this is not the case though. As our examples show, the problem can be reduced to a similar allocation problem, where, instead of penalizing the variance, we are concerned about the quadratic variation of our wealth portfolio.
There is still a lot of scope for research to be done in this area. First we have to investigate several other relevant examples. Then, we would like to investigate the same type of problems with parameter uncertainty. Optimal stopping and time inconsistent problems are also interesting to look into.
